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FAMILY LAW & CIVIL PROCEDURE-DADDY DILEMMA: SHOULD THE
TRUTH MATTER? Martin v. Pierce, No. 06-950, 2007 WL 1447911 (Ark.
May 17, 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a father and son playing catch in the backyard, or a father con-
soling his little princess when she has a nightmare. Picture a father and child
spending quality time together every birthday, Christmas Day, Thanksgiv-
ing, and Fathers' Day for sixteen years. Now imagine all of this being shat-
tered in the blink of an eye simply because the father and child share no
DNA match.
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court faced a similar dilemma in
Martin v. Pierce.1 After sixteen years of an established parent-child relation-
ship, the putative father sought a DNA test which excluded him as the bio-
logical father of the child.2 The father then asked the court to vacate all his
legal obligations with regard to the child.3 The Arkansas Supreme Court,
however, refused to terminate his legal obligations to the child and ordered
the putative father to continue paying child support.' The supreme court
followed years of precedent and held that if a court rendered a final divorce
order and a putative father subsequently discovered that he is not the biolog-
ical father of a child born during his marriage, he is barred, by the doctrine
of res judicata, from raising the issue of paternity.' The result was correct;
the court effectively takes into account the importance of an established
parent-child relationship and serves the best interest of the child by adhering
to a strict application of res judicata to preclude a paternity challenge when
paternity has previously been established under a divorce decree.
This note begins with an introduction explaining the presumption of
paternity, then it examines the doctrine of res judicata, how res judicata is
applied in cases of divorce, and the fraud exception to res judicata.6 This
part also contains a discussion of cases dealing with paternity disestablish-
ment after the entry of a divorce decree and fraud in the paternity context.7
Next, the note outlines the facts and reasoning utilized in the Martin deci-
1. No. 06-950,2007 WL 1447911 (Ark. May 17, 2007).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *4.
5. Id. at *3-4.
6. See infra Part II.A.-B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
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sion.' The note concludes that the Arkansas Supreme Court came to the cor-
rect conclusion based on the particular facts in Martin but also points out
questions that are left unanswered and proposes a solution to solve the po-
tential conflict that arises in paternity resolutions.9
II. BACKGROUND
This section briefly addresses the presumption of paternity, its history,
and the policy rationale it furthers." Then, the section will explain the doc-
trine of res judicata and how courts apply res judicata to cases of divorce. "
This section also contains a discussion of how different courts deal with the
issue of paternity disestablishment after the entry of a divorce decree. 2 Fi-
nally, the section explores the various exceptions to res judicata.'3 This sec-
tion will also expand upon the fraud exception and contain a discussion of
cases dealing with fraud in the paternity context.
4
A. The History of the Presumption of Paternity
"[T]he presumption is one of the strongest and most persuasive known
to the law .. . ."" Prior to the development of genetic testing, the marital
presumption was designed to create a biological certainty when there was no
other way of doing so.' 6 This presumption of legitimacy arose out of English
common law and stated that "any child born into a lawful marriage was pre-
sumed to be fruit of the marriage."' 7 The presumption served a number of
overlapping goals, but most importantly, it served to avoid the title of "ille-
gitimate child" and clarified whose duty it was to care for the child. 8
Under traditional common law, the presumption was "nearly irrebutta-
ble."' 9 Historically, it was essential that the husband prove impossibility to
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471,472 (N.Y. 1930).
16. Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children's Lives-Recreating
Paternity Fraud Laws to Protect Children's Interests, Note, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 237, 242
(2004).
17. Stephen A. Sherman, You Ain't My Baby Daddy: The Problem of Paternity Fraud
and Paternity Laws, 5 AvE MARA L. REV. 273,275(2007).
18. Id. at 276.
19. Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marit-
al Presumption, 65 MD. L. REv. 246, 248 (2006). See also In re Findlay, 170 N.E. at 472 ("If
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overcome the presumption. 20 For example, strong evidence that the husband
was. sterile, impotent, or did not have access to his wife during the period of
conception would suffice. 2' The law treated the husband and wife as a unit
and "regardless of what transpired during the marriage" the law was not to
interfere.22
Even with the scientific advancement of DNA testing, which can estab-
lish biological paternity with certainty, some courts have continued to apply
the presumption of paternity.23 In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,24 the United
States Supreme Court rejected the idea that a natural father had a constitu-
tional right to maintain a relationship with a child who was presumptively
fathered by another man.2 ' Despite a DNA test proving with ninety-eight
percent accuracy that Michael H. was the child's biological father,26 the
Court upheld a California statute that created the presumption that a child
born to a married woman is the child of the marriage. 27 The Court empha-
sized its tradition of protecting the marital family and the role of the pre-
sumption in preserving the stability of the family unit.28
Albeit with restrictions, courts have loosened the common law pre-
sumption of paternity by allowing men to contest paternity without a show-
ing of traditional means of refutation.29 Although the presumption is still
applied, "[t]he dramatic shift in family composition over the last several
decades in the United States has made the marital presumption increasingly
inadequate as the sole definition of fatherhood under the law."3 A large
number of courts therefore apply the doctrine of res judicata to preserve the
unitary, nuclear family.
3'
a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of
gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity.").
20. Sherman, supra note 17, at 276.
21. Id.
22. Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,24 (2004).
23. Brie S. Rogers, Comment, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A
Triumph of Law Over Biology, 70 U. CN. L. REv. 1151, 1154 (2002). See also Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998).
24. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
25. Id. at 127.
26. Id. at 110.
27. Id. at 119-21.
28. Id. at 123-25.
29. Sherman, supra note 17, at 274. Refute means "to prove (a statement) to be false" or
"to prove (a person) to be wrong." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (8th ed. 2004).
30. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support En-
forcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325,326 (2005).
31. See Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Ar-




Res judicata refers to "claim preclusion" because it precludes parties
from relitigating the same cause of action.32 The purpose of the doctrine "is
to put an end to litigation by precluding a party who has had the opportunity
for one fair trial from drawing the same controversy into issue a second time
before the same or a different court."33
The Arkansas Supreme Court has ruled that res judicata barred relitiga-
tion of a subsequent lawsuit if:
(1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first
suit was based upon proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully con-
tested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of ac-
tion; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privies.
34
Res judicata is not limited to claims that were actually litigated.35 In
fact, the doctrine also bars the relitigation of claims that could have been
litigated in the former suit.36 In Benedict v. Arbor Acres Farm, Inc.,3 7 the
Arkansas Supreme Court wrote:
The law of [r]es judicata provides that a prior decree bars a subsequent
suit when the subsequent cause involves the same subject matter as that
determined or which could have been determined in the former suit be-
tween the same parties; the bar extends to those questions of law and fact
which 'might (well) have been but were not presented.'
38
Similarly, the doctrine of res judicata will apply even if the subsequent
lawsuit addresses new legal issues and remedies, provided that the case at
bar is based on the same events and subject matter of the previous lawsuit.39
The key question therefore is whether or not the party "had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in question,"4 because if they did not, the
doctrine of res judicata will not apply."a
32. Swofford v. Stafford, 295 Ark. 433, 434-35, 748 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1988).
33. Taggart v. Moore, 292 Ark. 168, 171, 729 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1987).
34. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 350, 995
S.W.2d 338, 339 (1999); Miller County v. Opportunities, Inc., 334 Ark. 88, 94, 971 S.W.2d
781, 785 (1998); Hamilton v. Ark. Pollution Control & Ecology Comm'n, 333 Ark. 370, 374,
969 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1998).
35. Wells v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 272 Ark. 481,483,616 S.W.2d 718, 719 (1981).
36. Id., 616 S.W.2d at 719.
37. 265 Ark. 574, 579 S.W.2d 605 (1979).
38. Id. at 577, 579 S.W.2d at 607 (quoting Turner v. State, 248 Ark. 367, 372, 452
S.W.2d 317, 319 (1970)).
39. Swofford v. Stafford, 295 Ark. 433, 435, 748 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1988).
40. Brandon v. Ark. W. Gas Co., 76 Ark. App. 201,210, 61 S.W.3d 193, 199 (2001).
41. See id., 61 S.W.3d at 199.
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1. Res Judicata Effect of Divorce Decrees on the Paternity Issue
Paternity determinations vary from state to state.42 Whereas some states
preclude paternity challenges altogether, some allow them at any time. 3
Arkansas, however, recognizes that res judicata bars an adjudicated father
from challenging the paternity of a child after the establishment of paternity
under a divorce decree." Courts that apply this principle to the adjudicated
father treat the dissolution of marriage as a final judgment.45 Thus, even if
the issue of paternity is not formally raised or adjudicated in a divorce pro-
ceeding, res judicata may bar the subsequent adjudication of any issues in
relation to a divorce, such as paternity, custody, and child support.' This
approach locks a man into the role of the father even if he is not the biologi-
cal father. Although this may appear unjust, courts have held that the best
interest of the child outweighed any unfairness experienced by the father in
protecting the established parent-child relationship.
2. Arkansas's Application of Res Judicata to Divorce Decrees
In the context of divorce, Arkansas courts have applied the doctrine of
res judicata in various ways. This section will discuss a situation in which
res judicata does not apply,4" parties to whom res judicata does not apply,
49
and various situations in which Arkansas courts have applied the doctrine of
res judicata to preclude the relitigation of paternity.5
a. Situation where res judicata does not apply
In Golden v. Golden,5 during divorce proceedings the wife sought
dismissal of custody and visitation issues after a DNA test excluded her
husband as the father of a child born during the marriage. 2 The father ar-
42. Kording, supra note 16, at 240.
43. Id.
44. See McCormac v. McCormac, 304 Ark. 89, 90-91,799 S.W.2d 806, 807 (1990).
45. Sherman, supra note 17, at 285.
46. See State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 352, 995
S.W.2d 338, 340 (1999). See also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, in Subsequent
Proceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in Divorce or Annulment Decree or in
Support or Custody Order Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.L.R. 3d 846 (1977), for a detailed
discussion of the effect of paternity findings or implications of such, made incidental to a
divorce decree, on subsequent proceedings.
47. See Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998); Rogers, supra note 23, at 1156.
48. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
49. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
50. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
51. 57 Ark. App. 143, 942 S.W.2d 282 (1997).
52. Id. at 146, 942 S.W.2d at 283.
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gued that the lower court erred by failing to estop the wife from denying his
paternity of the child born during the marriage.13 Furthermore, he argued
that the doctrine of res judicata prevented his wife from relitigating the issue
of paternity.54 The Arkansas Court of Appeals found the father's argument
unavailing because there had only been one action in this case.5 The doc-
trine of res judicata did not apply because the wife raised the issue of pater-
nity for the first time in the course of the divorce proceedings.56
b. To whom res judicata does not apply
The Arkansas Court of Appeals, in Scallion v. Whiteaker,7 addressed
whether a divorce decree was res judicata to a paternity challenge brought
by the mother's present husband. 8 The court noted that it is settled in Ar-
kansas that a former husband and wife are bound by res judicata when pa-
ternity issues are litigated in a prior action. 9 The mother's present husband,
however, was not a party to the proceedings that dissolved the prior mar-
riage; therefore, the court found that the doctrine of res judicata did not
preclude a challenge to the child's paternity.6'
Eight years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court heard the case of State
Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Willis,61 which also stands for the
principle that a divorce decree will only have a res judicata effect on parties
to the prior action or their privities.62 In this case, John and Merigayle Trip-
lett married and had a child during the marriage. 63 The couple later obtained
a divorce in 1992, and their divorce decree stated that the parties had one
child.' John and Merigayle, however, remarried in 1993, and then Meri-
gayle informed John that he was not the child's father.65 In 1997, the couple
filed for divorce again, and John requested a DNA test to establish his bio-
logical relationship to the child.66 The DNA test excluded John as the child's
53. Id. at 150, 942 S.W.2d at 285.
54. Id., 942 S.W.2d at 285.
55. Id., 942 S.W.2d at 285.
56. Id., 942 S.W.2d at 285.
57. 44 Ark. App. 124, 868 S.W.2d 89 (1993).
58. Id. at 125, 868 S.W.2d at 90.
59. Id. at 126, 868 S.W.2d at 90.
60. Id., 868 S.W.2d at 90.
61. 347 Ark. 6, 59 S.W.3d 438 (2001).
62. Id. at 13, 59 S.W.3d at 443.
63. Id. at 9, 59 S.W.3d at 440.
64. Id., 59 S.W.3d at 440.
65. Id., 59 S.W.3d at 440.
66. Id. at 10, 59 S.W.3d at 440. In reaching its decision the court found it significant that
Merigayle did not object to John's request for DNA testing to establish the child's paternity
and furthermore that she did not argue the res judicata effect of the previous divorce decree in
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father, and the 1998 divorce decree found that no children were born of the
marriage.67
Subsequent scientific evidence revealed Christopher Willis as the
child's father, and, as a result, the Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) filed a paternity complaint against Willis.68 Willis denied paternity
and raised the affirmative defense of res judicata. 69 The Arkansas Supreme
Court, however, found that because Willis was not in privity with a party to
the 1992 divorce decree and did not participate in any way, the principle of
res judicata could not govern the outcome of the case. 70 The subsequent pa-
ternity action between OCSE and Willis, therefore, was not barred by res
judicata and could proceed.7'
c. Positive application of res judicata
In McCormac v. McCormac,72 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
res judicata barred a mother from relitigating the paternity issue following a
divorce decree.73 The mother sought to re-litigate paternity in response to
her ex-husband's motion asking the court to hold her in contempt for failing
to comply with visitation.74 In the original divorce decree, the court awarded
custody, set child support, and fixed visitation.75 Furthermore, the mother
pled in the divorce action that the child was born of the marriage, and the
father admitted this fact.76 The court held, therefore, the mother could not re-
litigate the paternity of the child.
77
Less than a year later, the Arkansas Court of Appeals heard the case of
Benac v. State.78 The divorce decree entered in the State of North Carolina
found that there was one child born of the marriage.79 After moving to Ar-
kansas, the State sued the father for child support through its child support
enforcement unit. 0 In response, the father claimed that he was not the
the 1998 divorce proceedings. Id. at 14, 59 S.W.3d at 444. The court noted therefore, "[T]he
1998 decree leaves Megan without a biological father." Id., 59 S.W.3d at 444.
67. Willis, 347 Ark. at 10, 59 S.W.2d at 440-41.
68. Id., 59 S.W.2d at 441.
69. Id., 59 S.W.2d at 441.
70. Id. at 13-14, 59 S.W.3d at 443.
71. Id. at 14, 59 S.W.3d at 444.
72. 304 Ark. 89, 799 S.W.2d 806 (1990).
73. Id. at 91, 799 S.W.2d at 807.
74. Id. at 90, 799 S.W.2d at 806.
75. Id., 799 S.W.2d at 806.
76. Id., 799 S.W.2d at 806.
77. Id. at 91, 799 S.W.2d at 807.
78. 34 Ark. App. 238, 808 S.W.2d 797 (1991).
79. Id. at 239, 808 S.W.2d at 798.
80. Id. at 238-39, 808 S.W.2d at 798.
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child's father and requested a blood test to determine paternity."' The court
subsequently found that the child's paternity had been established by the
North Carolina court and that the issue was barred by res judicata8 2 The
court denied the father's motion for blood testing.13 Judicial refusal to order
scientific testing "parallel[s] the historic refusal[ ] to admit testimony about
'access' and they strongly suggest that the law treats paternity as a social
construction not a biological fact."'
In 1999, in State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 5 the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a man had to continue to pay child sup-
port for two children not biologically his.86 The court noted that the divorce
decree stated that children were born during the marriage and that the issues
of custody, child support, and visitation were resolved during the divorce
proceeding.87 Later, the father filed a petition to modify the child support
order and requested blood tests to establish paternity.88 The lower court or-
dered the paternity test, and when the results excluded the appellee as the
biological father, the court abated his child support obligations.8 9
OCSE appealed the lower court's judgment and argued that the prior
divorce decree between the parties was res judicata on the paternity issue.9"
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed and held that the issue of paternity was
decided during the divorce proceedings.9' The court noted that the father had
an opportunity to raise the paternity issue in the divorce action; he failed to
do so.9' Furthermore, the court addressed significant policy considerations
that favor this effect of divorce decrees on issues of paternity. 93
81. Id. at 239, 808 S.W.2d at 798.
82. Id., 808 S.W.2d at 798. The court further noted that it is under a "constitutional
command" to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other state courts. Id. at 240, 808
S.W.2d at 798.
83. Id. at 240, 808 S.W.2d at 798.
84. Baker, supra note 22, at 14.
85. 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999).
86. Id. at 352, 995 S.W.2d at 340-41.
87. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 340.
88. Id. at 349-50, 995 S.W.2d at 339.
89. Id. at 350, 995 S.W.2d at 339.
Prior to the entry of [the] order, the court ruled from the bench that from a purely
legal standpoint, the argument that res judicata applied was correct, but that from
an equitable standpoint, he was not going to force the appellee to pay child sup-
port on two children who were not biologically his. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 339 (em-
phasis omitted).
90. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 339.
91. Williams, 338 Ark. at 352, 995 S.W.2d at 340.
92. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 340.
93. Id. at 351-52, 995 S.W.2d at 340. The court cited the Vermont Supreme Court for
some insight to some of these policy concerns:
Although we understand plaintiff's interest in ascertaining the true genetic make-
up of the child, we agree with the many jurisdictions holding that the financial
[Vol. 30
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The court also addressed Arkansas Code section 9-10-115(d), "which
addresses modification of a child-support order when it is determined in a
paternity suit that a man is not the biological father of a child.""4 The court
concluded that section 9-10-115(d) is part of the Paternity Code, and there-
fore is not applicable to divorce decrees. 95 During a marriage, a husband and
child establish a parent-child relationship with one another.96 The same is
usually not true in an adjudication of paternity in a paternity suit. 97 The court
noted that "[t]his distinction lies at the heart of the disparate treatment ac-
corded scientific testing after a finding of paternity under the Paternity Code
and scientific testing which occurs after a divorce decree under our case-
law."98
3. What Other States Are Doing
a. Cases enforcing paternity judgments
Many other states have made it difficult for legal fathers to disestablish
paternity subsequent to a paternity judgment or divorce decree.99 Below are
some cases that address how other states have relied on the doctrine of res
judicata and various courts' policy considerations that encompass this ap-
proach.
In 1997, the Georgia Court of Appeals barred a putative father's at-
tempt to establish paternity of the child of his former wife when the couple's
and emotional welfare of the child, and the preservation of an established par-
ent-child relationship, must remain paramount .... Whatever the interests of the
presumed father in ascertaining the genetic "truth" of a child's origins, they re-
main subsidiary to the interests of the state, the family, and the child in main-
taining the continuity, financial support, and psychological security of an estab-
lished parent-child relationship. Therefore, absent a clear and convincing
showing that it would serve the best interests of the child, child, a prior adjudi-
cation of paternity is conclusive.
Id., 995 S.W.2d at 340 (quoting Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998)).
94. Id. at 353, 995 S.W.2d at 341.
95. Id, 995 S.W.2d at 341.
96. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 341.
97. Williams, 338 Ark at 353, 995 S.W.2d at 341.
98. Id., 995 S.W.2d at 341.
99. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Rogers, 697 N.E.2d 1193, 1197-98 (I11. App. Ct. 1998),
superseded by statute, Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 90-715, 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/7(b-5), as recognized in Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342, 350-51 (I11. App.
Ct. 2001). (invoking principles of res judicata to uphold former husband's paternity and duty
to pay child support); Hackley v. Hackley, 395 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mich. 1986) ("A party
cannot withhold a defense to be used in the retrial of a paternity dispute when that defense
could have [been] brought in the prior suit."); Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789, 791 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that a divorce decree which states that children were born during the
marriage is sufficient to constitute a determination of paternity).
20081
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divorce decree was silent on the issue of children."° The putative father,
Grice, and Detwiler, the wife, married on June 11, 1982, but soon separated
and obtained a divorce.' Even though a child was born during the mar-
riage, the wife amended her complaint for divorce to say that it was physi-
cally impossible for Grice to be the child's father. 2 The divorce decree
issued on January 3, 1983, was silent on the issue of children.'0 3 In 1983, the
wife married Ogle and had the child's last name changed to the name of her
current husband."° Detwiler and Ogle divorced in 1989, and their divorce
decree stated that two children were born of the marriage.'05
After receiving information that the child was his biological son, Grice
filed a petition to establish paternity and sought custody. 6 Ogle moved to
dismiss Grice's action, claiming that the 1983 divorce decree constituted res
judicata on the issue of Grice's paternity.'07 The court noted that while Grice
knew that a question existed regarding his paternity in the 1983 divorce ac-
tion, he failed to do anything to resolve the issue. 0 8 Furthermore, even
though Grice asserted allegations of fraud, the court found that the allega-
tions were "insufficient to overcome the res judicata effect of the first di-
vorce decree."'0 9 Ogle acknowledged the child as his son and cared for him
for thirteen years. 10 The court, therefore, refused to disturb the established
parent-child relationship that existed between the two."'
In Godin v. Godin,"2 the Supreme Court of Vermont denied the request
of a former husband who sought to have his paternity vacated six years after
100. Grice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
101. Id. at 755.
102. Id. at 756.
103. Id.
104. Id. The wife had a brief affair with Ogle before her marriage to Grice and therefore
she assured Ogle that he was the child's biological father. Id. at 755-56. For the next twelve
years Ogle thought this was the truth. Id. at 756.
105. Id.
106. Grice, 488 S.E.2d at 756.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 757.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court wrote:
It is clear from our examination of the legitimation and paternity statutes that the
primary purpose of these statutes is to provide for the establishment rather than
the disestablishment of legitimacy and paternity .... That these statutes should
be used to establish legitimacy and paternity is appropriate; it is certainly not in
the legitimate child's best interest to be rendered illegitimate. Moreover, public
policy will not permit a mother and an alleged father to enlist the aid of the
courts to disturb the emotional ties existing between a child and his legal father
after sitting on their rights for the first three years of the child's life.
Id. (quoting Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501, 505-06 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)).
112. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998).
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the entry of a divorce decree. 1 3 After hearing rumors within his family, the
former husband became suspicious that he was not the child's biological
father." 4 He began to re-evaluate his relationship with the child's mother
and realized that ten months elapsed between the child's alleged conception
and her birth.15 The father thereafter sought genetic testing, and he asked
the court to vacate the part of the divorce decree that established his paterni-
ty. 1 16
Mr. Godin argued that due to the fraud perpetrated by the mother dur-
ing the divorce proceedings, the court should set aside his paternity and
child support obligations." 7 The court, however, determined that merely
alleging that the child was born of the marriage did not constitute fraud for
the purpose of vacating judgment." 8 Mr. Godin could have challenged pa-
ternity based on the elapsed time during his divorce; this however was not
newly discovered evidence to justify relitigation of the issue." 9
Even more compelling were the policy concerns that dictate finality of
determinations of paternity.'2° Mr. Godin lived with the child as her father
for the first eight years of her life and continued to treat her as his daughter
for six years thereafter.' The court added, "[i]t is thus readily apparent that
a parent-child relationship was formed, and it is that relationship, and not
the results of a genetic test, that must control."'
' 22
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia pre-
vented a divorced father from contesting the paternity of his eleven-year-old
daughter, Crystal. 23 The divorce action occurred in 1996, and a divorce de-
cree was filed stating that three children were born of the marriage. 24 Five
years later, William discovered through scientific testing that he was not
Crystal's biological father and subsequently filed a petition to terminate
child support. 125 William argued that it was not in the child's best interest to
apply the doctrine of res judicata when an alleged father learns that he is not
the child's biological father. 26 The court, however, disagreed and found it
significant that William maintained a parent-child relationship with Crystal
113. Id. at911-12.








122. Id. at 911.
123. Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 80 (W. Va. 2002).
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 81.
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for over six years before the divorce and continued to exercise his visitation
privileges after the divorce.1 27 Furthermore, the court discussed that although
courts previously addressed children's rights within the perspective of com-
peting adults' rights, the current trend is to give greater recognition to child-
ren's rights.
12
b. Courts refusing to apply res j udicata in paternity
disestablishment cases
Despite the policy concerns considered above, some states have re-
jected the application of res judicata to paternity disestablishment cases.1
29
Rather than focusing on the best interest of the child, these states have
framed their analysis in terms of the nonbiological father's best interest.1
30
In Spears v. Spears,13 1 the Kentucky Court of Appeals allowed a former
husband to challenge a finding of paternity in a dissolution action. 132 While
the court acknowledged that prior courts have held that res judicata bars the
relitigation of paternity issues, it refused to apply the doctrine to the case at
bar. 33 The court held that applying res judicata in that case would only work
an injustice. 13 Furthermore, the court noted that the doctrine "must at times
127. Id. at 86. The court, quoting its opinion in Michael K. T. v. Tina L.T., explained "that
a reviewing court must examine the issue of whether an 'individual attempting to disestablish
paternity has held himself out to be the father of the child for a sufficient period of time such
that disproof of paternity would result in undeniable hann to the child."' Id. (quoting Micheal
K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va. 1989)).
128. Id. (quoting State Dep't of Health and Human Res., Child Advocate Office ex rel.
Cline v. Pentasuglia, 457 S.E.2d 644, 648 (W. Va. (1995)). The court emphasized the impor-
tance of finality in paternity determinations by quoting its opinion in Nancy Darlene M v.
James Lee M, Jr:
If we were to recognize that the appellee could continue to raise the issue of pa-
ternity nearly five years after the birth of his putative daughter, then our domestic
relations law would be replete with cases in which paternity is denied, and, con-
sequently, child support payments, necessary for the daily needs of children's
lives, would never be met.
Id. (quoting Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., Jr., 400 S.E.2d 882, 886 (W. Va. 1990)).
129. See Spears v. Spears, 784 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Langston v. Rifle, 754
A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
130. Id.
131. 784 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
132. Id. at607-08.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 607. The court added that "res judicata is to be applied in particular situations
as fairness and justice require, and that it is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends
of justice, or so as to work an injustice." Id. (quoting 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 402
(1990)).
[Vol. 30
FAMILY LAW & CIVIL PROCEDURE
be weighed against competing interests, and must, on occasion, yield to oth-
er policies."'3
In Langston v. Riffe,'36 the Court of Appeals of Maryland also recog-
nized the injustice that results from precluding an alleged father from chal-
lenging paternity after DNA tests prove he is not the child's biological fa-
ther. 137 The court also agreed with several policy concerns in favor of chal-
lenging paternity made in a dissenting opinion from a Maryland court."'3 If a
putative father is barred from relitigating paternity, a child may never know
the true identity of his or her father and may be "prevented from inheriting
or receiving benefits from his [or her] actual father, who might be more fi-
nancially stable than the putative father."'' 39 Aside from the financial stand-
point, accurate paternity determinations are important because "a child may
later be in need of a blood transfusion or an organ transplant from a compat-
ible family member. A child may face decisions about marriage and child-
bearing based on the risk of passing on what the child believes are inherited
conditions."'4 °
Both the Kentucky and Maryland courts' analyses vary in great degree
with the courts that strictly apply the principle of res judicata to preclude an
adjudicated father from challenging paternity. Each court values public poli-
cy, but the difference lies in the courts' public policy objectives.
C. Exceptions to Res Judicata
Adjudicated fathers are not without recourse; they may seek relief from
a final judgment through the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
60(b).' 41 Most states employ some form of FRCP 60(b). 142 For instance,
Rule 60(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to obtain
relief from a final judgment. " Rule 60(c) states:
The court in which a judgment... has been rendered or order made shall
have the power, after the expiration of ninety (90) days of the filing of
said judgment with the clerk of the court, to vacate or modify such
135. Id. (quoting 46 Am. JUR.2d Judgments § 402 (1990)).
136. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
137. Id. at404n.13.
138. Id. at 403 n.ll (citing Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648 A.2d 439, 451 (Md. 1994), su-
perseded by statute, Act effective Oct. 1, 1995, 1995 Md. Laws, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-1038 (West 2007), as recognized in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., 741 A.2d 553, 561 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (Eldridge, J., dissenting)).
139. Id. (citing Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648 A.2d at 451 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)).
140. Id. (quoting Tandra S., 648 A.2d at 451 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)):
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
142. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
143. ARK. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
judgment or order: (1) By granting a new trial where the grounds there-
fore were discovered after the expiration of ninety (90) days after the
filing of the judgment, or, where the ground is newly discovered evi-
dence which the moving party could not have discovered in time to file
a motion under Rule 59(b), upon a motion for new trial filed with the
clerk of the court not later than one year after discovery of the
grounds... ; (2) By a new trial granted in proceedings against defen-
dants constructively summoned, and who did not appear... ; (3) For mi-
sprisions of the clerk; (4) For misrepresentation or fraud (whether he-
retofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) by an adverse party; (5) For
erroneous proceedings against an infant or person of unsound mind
where the condition of such defendant does not appear in the record, nor
the error in the proceedings; (6) For the death of one of the parties be-
fore the judgment in the action; (7) For errors in a judgment shown by an
infant within twelve (12) months after reaching the age of eighteen (18)
years upon a showing of cause.144
Rule 60(c) therefore gives putative and biological fathers an extra pathway
to contest a ruling that they are or are not a child's father.
145
The fraud exception to res judicata is the most popular remedy in pa-
ternity disestablishment cases. 14 6 Although paternity fraud has occurred for
many years, it has become a widespread problem. 147 Fraudulent concealment
occurs when a father is justified in believing that he is the child's biological
father, and the mother fails to inform him otherwise.148 State courts are left
with the decision of what legal doctrines to apply in paternity fraud cases.
49
Although "many courts still rule against the presumed fathers in paternity
fraud cases, there has been a growing trend in courts to find for the pre-
sumed fathers and allow them to discontinue child support."'15 The follow-
ing section will consider how Arkansas applies the fraud exception' 5' and




146. ARK. R. Crv. P. 60(c)(4).
147. See Betty L.W. v. William E. W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 88 (W. Va. 2002) (Maynard, J.,
dissenting) for the following:
In 1999 alone, almost one-third of 280,000 paternity cases evaluated by the
American Association of Blood Banks excluded the individual tested as the bio-
logical father of the child. In a period of only one year, that is almost 100,000
men who were falsely accused of being the father of a child which they simply
did not father.
Id. (Maynard, J., dissenting).
148. Kording, supra note 16, at 243.
149. Sherman, supra note 17, at 281.
150. Id.
151. See infra Part II.C.l.
152. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. Arkansas's Application of the Fraud Exception
Prior to 2000, an Arkansas court would only set aside a judgment under
Rule 60(c)(4) for extrinsic, but not intrinsic, fraud.'53 Extrinsic fraud is fraud
that "prevented the unsuccessful party from fully presenting his case, or
which operated as an imposition on the jurisdiction of the court."'' 54 Fur-
thermore, it can include a fraud upon the court in obtaining a judgment. 5'
Some examples of extrinsic fraud include:
Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or
where the defendant never had knowledge of the acts of the plaintiff;
or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regu-
larly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other
side .. 156
In contrast, evidence of intrinsic fraud, which includes false testimony
or forged documents, was not sufficient to set aside a judgment.'57 The pur-
pose of excluding intrinsic evidence "is to preserve finality of judgments
and avoid re-litigating issues the party had an opportunity to present at the
original proceeding on the matter."' 8 In January 2000, however, the legisla-
ture amended Rule 60(c)(4) to eliminate the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud' 59 Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 60(c)(4) now provides
that a judgment may be set aside any time after ninety days "[f]or misrepre-
sentation or fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) by
an adverse party."'6 °
In 2003, the Arkansas Court of Appeals heard the case of Graves v.
Stevison,16 1 which verified that Arkansas's application of the fraud exception
153. Graves v. Stevison, 81 Ark. App. 137, 140, 98 S.W.3d 848, 850 (2003).
154. Johnson v. Johnson, 169 Ark. 1151, 1153,277 S.W. 535, 535 (1925).
155. Parker v. Sims, 185 Ark. 1111, 1116, 51 S.W.2d 517, 520 (1932).
156. Alexander v. Alexander, 217 Ark. 230, 235, 229 S.W.2d. 234, 236 (1950) (quoting
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878)).
157. Turley v. Owen, 188 Ark. 1067, 1071, 69 S.W.2d 882, 884 (1934). See also Alexan-
der, 217 Ark. at 236, 229 S.W.2d at 237 (holding that falsifying testimony only amounted to
intrinsic fraud, which was not the type of fraud necessary to modify or vacate the decree).
158. Kording, supra note 16, at 256. See also Johnson, 169 Ark. at 1153, 277 S.W. at 535
("The mischief in retrying every case in which a decree rendered on false testimony given by
perjured witnesses would be greater, by reason of the endless nature of the strife, than any
compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases.").
159. Graves v. Stevison, 81 Ark. App. 137, 140, 98 S.W.3d 848, 850 (2003).
160. ARK. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(4).
161. 81 Ark. App. 137, 98 S.W.3d 848 (2003).
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in paternity disestablishment cases is very limited. 162 After learning that he
was not the child in question's father, Graves filed a petition for relief from
judgment in the previous divorce action. 163 He further requested that the
court terminate all child-support obligations." Graves argued that he was
entitled to have his paternity disestablished because his ex-wife committed
intrinsic fraud by not disclosing to him that he was not the child's biological
father. 6 The issue required the court to determine whether or not such fraud
defeated the defense of res judicata. After reviewing the Williams case, the
court concluded that the type of fraud exhibited in the case at bar was well
tolerated in Arkansas for public policy reasons.'66
The court, however, expressed its distaste for such a policy, stating, "it
is bad policy to reward an adulterous, deceitful, nefarious, lying litigant to
saddle an unsuspecting man with such a burden, but it appears to be the law,
and this Court is obliged to enforce it.' ' 167 Albeit unwillingly, the court held
that Williams controlled and that the amendment to Rule 60(c)(4) did not
warrant setting aside the determination of Graves' paternity in the divorce
decree. 1
68
In his concurring opinion, Judge Griffen also stated his distaste for a
public policy forcing men to pay child support for children that are not their
own. 169 Judge Griffen claimed that although children deserve child support,
they only deserve to get that support from men responsible for their exis-
tence. 7 ° Judge Griffen further acknowledged that "[w]e do not allow perpe-
trators of fraud to profit from their deceit in any other area of the law,"''7
and therefore "we should [not] make an exception in family law."'
172
Judge Griffen claimed that the consequences of following Williams are
disturbing in other respects. "The law can take a man's money by court or-
162. See id. at 140-43, 98 S.W.3d at 851-52.
163. Id. at 139, 98 S.W.3d at 849.
164. Id., 98 S.W.3d at 849.
165. Id. at 140, 98 S.W.3d at 850.
166. Id. at 141, 98 S.W.3d at 850. See State Office of Child Support Enforcement v.
Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 351-52, 995 S.W.2d 338, 339-41 (1999) (indicating that the best
interest of the child must prevail over any unfairness to the father, and that children of such
marriages are entitled to support).
167. Graves, 81 Ark. App. at 141, 98 S.W.3d at 850. The court further noted that since
the mother named the true father in an affidavit, "[iut is not as though the child will remain in
blissful ignorance of the true fact." Id. at 141, 98 S.W.3d at 850-5 1.
168. Id. at 141,98 S.W.3d at 851.
169. Id. at 144-46, 98 S.W.3d at 852-54 (Griffen, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 145, 98 S.W.3d at 853.
171. Id., 98 S.W.3d at 853 (Griffen, J., concurring). "Any process that defies the truth it
discovers in favor of a lie it formerly believed is ultimately unjust and undeserving of respect,
no matter how much we rationalize it and despite our success in compelling deceived men to
obey it." Id. at 146, 98 S.W.3d at 854.
172. Id. at 145, 98 S.W.3d at 853.
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der, however, no court can force a man to love a child he knows is not his
own."' 73 The main point of Judge Griffen's concurring opinion was that by
continuing to follow Williams, the courts were unjustly rewarding the frau-
dulent mothers. Judge Griffen, however, agreed with the majority's affirma-
tion that the Arkansas Court of Appeals must follow and apply the law set
forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Williams. 1
74
In McGee v. McGee,'75 the father filed a motion requesting DNA test-
ing to determine the issue of paternity. 76 During a hearing held by the trial
court, the mother admitted that when the twins were born, she did not know
whether McGee was the biological father. 77 The trial court found that res
judicata barred the relitigation of paternity. 7 1 McGee appealed and asserted
the defense of fraud.'79 The court, however, reaffirmed its holding in Graves
and held that "Williams strongly suggests that this is not the type of fraud
that will provide a 'defrauded' father the opportunity to relitigate the issue
of paternity."' 8 °
2. How Other States Apply the Fraud Exception
Although the fraud exception is widely recognized as an exception to
the doctrine of res judicata, many courts follow Arkansas's approach and
allow public policy to dictate whether a putative father will be allowed to
disestablish paternity or cease making child support payments.'' States that
take this approach place the emphasis on the child's best interest in preserv-
ing financial stability and the parent-child relationship over the best interest
of the father. 82 This, however, is not true of all courts. Although in the mi-
nority, some courts allow a putative father to institute a subsequent paternity
173. Graves, 81 Ark. App. at 146, 98 S.W.3d at 853-54 (Griffen, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 146, 98 S.W.3d at 854.
175. No. CA 06-1342, 2007 WL 2713362 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2007).
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *2.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Ince v. Ince, 58 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. App. 2001) (failing to set aside
paternity established in a divorce decree because wife's statements only amounted to intrin-
sic, rather than extrinsic fraud). The Ince court further noted that, "[b]eing a parent has al-
ways meant more than simply proving the DNA necessary to create human life originated
from a particular individual." Id.
182. See, e.g., Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 498-99 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a
mother's actions of not telling adjudicated father that he may not be biological father does not
constitute fraud upon the court). The Cheryl court further added that when the father and
child have a substantial parent-child relationship, "an attempt to undo a determination of
paternity 'is potentially devastating to a child who has considered the man to be the father."'
Id. at 495-96 (quoting Hackley v. Hackley, 345 N.W.2d 906, 913 n. 11 (Mich. 1986)).
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action based on a mother's fraudulent concealment.'83 Rather than consider-
ing the best interest of the child, these courts focus solely on the deceit exer-
cised by the child's mother and upon the rights of the nonbiological father to
have his paternity judgment vacated.
For example, a recent Pennsylvania decision discounted the best inter-
est of the child and focused on the unfairness placed upon a man who had
been forced to pay child support for a child that was not biologically his.'84
In Doran v. Doran,85 the ex-husband asked the court to dismiss his child
support obligations of his eleven year old child after DNA testing revealed
that his probability of paternity was zero percent.'86 Soon after this discov-
ery, Mr. Doran "as gently as possible removed himself from the child's life
in a way which he felt would cause the child the least amount of anguish and
hurt."
187
The court held that the former husband was not estopped from denying
the child's paternity because of the wife's fraud. 8 8 The court found suffi-
cient evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Mr. Doran would not
have acted as the child's father or provided him emotional and financial
support but for the ex-wife's misrepresentation of Mr. Doran's paternity. 9
Furthermore, the court quoted and adopted in large part the trial judge's
opinion. The trial judge portrayed the nonbiological father as a hero who
supported another man's child as a result of the deceitfulness of the child's
mother. 9 The court noted that if the child's mother had told the truth in the
183. See In reMarriage of M.E. & D.E., 622 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (find-
ing that the mother perpetrated fraud upon the court and, therefore, the issue of paternity was
not barred by res judicata); Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523, 526 (Nev. 1998) (holding that res
judicata did not bar a challenge to paternity because an issue of material fact existed as to
whether the wife fraudulently concealed the child's paternity); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d
499, 503 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that putative father's action challenging paternity was
not barred by res judicata because he had no knowledge of alleged facts supporting his fraud
claim at time of divorce); Batrouny v. Batrouny, 412 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that a former husband could challenge paternity and support issues because former
wife committed fraud on court by misrepresenting that eldest child was born of the marriage).
184. Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283-85 (Pa. 2003). This case is significantly dif-
ferent from a previous decision of a Pennsylvania court, which held that an ex-husband could
not disestablish paternity despite genetic proof of nonpaternity. Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688
A.2d 726 (1997). In Miscovich, the court characterized the ex-husband's attempt to disestab-
lish paternity as disgusting. Id. at 732.
185. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2003).
186. Id. at 1281.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1284-85. The court noted that "application of estoppel would punish the party
that sought to do what was righteous and reward the party that has perpetrated a fraud." Id. at
1283-84.
189. Id. at 1284.
190. Id.
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beginning, things might have turned out differently."' "Unfortunately, her
deceit, falsehoods and misrepresentations gave Mr. Doran no reason but to
treat the child as his own-with love, care and respect, as only a decent hu-
man being would do under the circumstances."'
' 92
Although the fraud exception exists, it is evident that states have al-
lowed a wide amount of discretion to determine how to apply the exception.
It depends upon whose interest the court places emphasis and the particular
facts of each case.
III. THE CASE
A. Facts
Kevin Martin and Lisa Pierce were married in 1988, and in 1997 Pierce
filed a complaint for divorce.' The court entered a divorce decree on July
8, 1997, and found that two children were born of the marriage.'94 The prop-
erty settlement agreement incorporated into the decree required Martin to
pay child support to Pierce. 95
On November 8, 2004, Pierce, the appellee, filed a petition for con-
tempt against Martin, the appellant, for failing to comply with the prior
court order with respect to child support 96 and medical expenses for the
child, C.M.'97 The appellant filed a response and counterclaim alleging that
any implicit adjudication of paternity in the parties' divorce decree was due
to the appellee's alleged fraud, and the appellant subsequently requested a
paternity test. 98 The appellant claimed that prior to the entry of the divorce
decree, without his knowledge, the appellee told an acquaintance that the
appellant was not C.M.'s biological father.'99 The appellant further re-
quested that the support order concerning C.M. be vacated. 200 The circuit
court granted the paternity test, and the results excluded the appellant as
C.M.'s biological father.2°'
191. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1284.
192. Id. (quoting the lower court's decision, Order No. DR-454 of 1994 (Penn. Ct.
Comm. Pl. 2002)).




197. Reply Brief for Appellee at 1, Martin v. Pierce, No. 06-00950 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov.
22, 2006).
198. Appellant's Abstract, Briefs, and Addendum at 1, Martin v. Pierce, No. 06-00950
(Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2006).
199. Id.




Later, the appellant filed an amended counterclaim to include damages
for outrage.2 2 The appellant also asked that the court's prior decree and or-
ders obligating him to pay support for C.M. be vacated, and he demanded a
jury trial.2 3
Subsequently, the appellee filed a pro se motion for appointment of an
attorney ad litem, which the circuit court ultimately granted because C.M.
stood to be substantially affected by any decisions rendered and, therefore,
was entitled to representation.2" On January 13, 2006, C.M., by and through
his attorney ad litem, filed a motion for declaratory judgment asking the
lower court to declare that the appellant was his father. 205 The appellant re-
sponded that declaratory relief was not appropriate for a nonparty and that
the motion should be denied.2°6 The appellant went even further and sup-
plemented his response to the motion to argue that it would be a violation of
equal protection if divorced men were not permitted to challenge their pa-
ternity pursuant to Arkansas Code section 9-10-115.2°7
The circuit court held, however, that because Arkansas Code section 9-
10-115 was part of the Paternity Code, it did not apply to cases involving a
divorce decree.28 The circuit court, therefore, granted the motion for decla-
ratory judgment and declared that the appellant was established as the father
of C.M. in the divorce decree and could not attack the decree.20 9 The circuit
court also held that all challenges by the appellant with respect to the pater-
nity of C.M., his duty to pay child support, and any other legal obligations
were dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. 2'0 Furthermore, the
court found that subsequent amendments to Arkansas Code section 9-10-115
did not change the outcome of the decision.21' "Due to factors concerning
the remaining issues between the parties, 212 the circuit court held that an
immediate appeal was appropriate.2" 3
The appellant appealed the circuit court's judgment, 214 and the case was
certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 25 The appellant argued the follow-





206. Appellant's Abstract, Briefs, and Addendum, supra note 198, at 2.
207. Reply Brief for Appellee, supra note 197, at 2.
208. Id.
209. Martin, 2007 WL. 1447911, at *1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Appellant's Abstract, Brief, and Addendum, supra note 198, at 2.
213. Id.
214. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at * 1.
215. Id.
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attorney ad litem; (2) that the circuit court erred by holding that res judicata
bared the appellant from revisiting the issue of paternity and child support;
and (3) that the circuit court erred in finding that subsequent amendments to
Arkansas Code section 9-10-115 did not change the outcome of the deci-
sion.21 6 This note will only address the appellant's second and third points
on appeal.
B. Reasoning
Justice Hannah wrote for the majority." 7 The court largely mirrored its
approach in State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 2 8 find-
ing that Arkansas Code section 9-10-1 15 is part of the Paternity Code 219 and
that there is nothing to suggest that it should apply to divorce decrees.22° In
Martin v. Pierce,221 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that when the issue of
paternity is established under a divorce decree, the principle of res judicata
applies.222 A father, therefore, cannot challenge his paternity of and duty to
pay child support for the minor child subsequent to the decree.223 Further-
more, even after the General Assembly made substantial changes to the sta-
tute, the court concluded that § 9-10-115 did not apply to paternity actions
arising as a matter of presumption under a divorce decree.224
Justice Brown filed a dissenting opinion in which he disputed the ma-
jority's view that once there is a divorce decree declaring a man to be the
father, that adjudication is irrevocable regardless of a DNA test excluding
that man as the child's biological father.225 Justice Brown also rejected the
majority's interpretation of the General Assembly's intent with regard to the
amendments made to Arkansas Code section 9-10-115.226 Justice Corbin
joined in Justice Brown's dissenting opinion.27
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999).
219. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *5-6.
220. Id.
221. No. 06-950, 2007 WL 1447911 (Ark. May 17, 2007).
222. Id. at *4.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *6.
225. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
226. Id.





Justice Hannah began the analysis by discussing the circuit court's re-
liance on the Williams case.228 In Williams, the Arkansas Supreme Court
discussed facts strikingly similar to the present case and held that a former
husband's failure to raise and litigate the issue of paternity before entry of
the divorce decree (which stated that children were born of the marriage)
triggered a res judicata bar to relitigation of paternity suit.229 The majority
noted that the Williams case was not the only instance when it had applied
the doctrine of res judicata to paternity issues.230
The court then discussed how it had applied the doctrine of res judicata
earlier in McCormac v. McCormac.3 In McCormac, a mother sought to
relitigate paternity following a divorce decree.232 The mother and father both
agreed in the divorce action that the child was born of the marriage; there-
fore, the Arkansas Supreme Court barred the mother's claim under the doc-
trine of res judicata.233
The majority also added that the Arkansas Court of Appeals had held
similarly in several cases and it emphasized that other jurisdictions were in
agreement with its view of the res judicata effect of divorce decrees on the
paternity issue, citing several cases to that effect.
234
Having set the stage for deciding the present case, the majority pointed
out policy considerations, raised by the Vermont Supreme Court, that favor
this view of the res judicata effect of divorce decrees in paternity disputes.235
The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized the importance of an established
parent-child relationship and reasoned that a father's interest in determining
the true genetic makeup of a child shall "remain subsidiary to the interest of
the state, the family, and the child in maintaining the continuity, financial
support, and psychological security of an established parent-child relation-
ship. '236 The Vermont Supreme Court also felt that making a prior adjudica-
228. Id. at *2, 4-6 (majority opinion).
229. Id. at *2.
230. Id. at *3.
231. 304 Ark. 89, 799 S.W.2d 806 (1990).
232. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911 at *3.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *3-4. See, e.g., Grice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); In re
Paternity of Rogers, 697 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523 (Nev.
1998); Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
235. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *4.
236. Id. (quoting Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998)).
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tion of paternity conclusive would help "deter parents from dissolving their
parental bonds for financial or other self-serving reasons." 2"
The majority concluded its res judicata analysis by holding that be-
cause the appellant failed to contest the issue of paternity during the divorce,
it was decided in the divorce decree.238 The doctrine of res judicata, there-
fore, applied.239
b. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60
The majority recognized, but disagreed with, the appellant's argument
that the alleged fraud committed by the appellee excused him from the find-
ing of paternity in the divorce decree.240 The appellant argued that, pursuant
to Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 60,241 he was entitled to relief and cited
Dickson v. Fletcher2 42 to support this proposition. 243 The Dickson case in-
volved a husband who failed to disclose his ownership of securities in his
discovery responses during his divorce. 2" The Arkansas Supreme Court,
therefore, applied Rule 60(c)(4) and allowed modification of the divorce
decree to include the division of such property.
245
The appellant argued that, like the appellant in Dickson, the court
should allow him the opportunity to modify his divorce decree because the
appellee had committed fraud.246 The majority, however, refused to apply
the reasoning of Dickson to the present case because of public policy con-
cerns.247 They reasoned that "the public policy against the bastardization of a
sixteen-year-old child is not analogous to the intentional concealment of
marital property. 24 8 The majority, therefore, concluded that Rule 60(c)(4)







241. ARK. R. CIv. P. 60(c)(4) provides the following:
(c) The court in which a judgment... has been rendered or order made shall
have the power, after the expiration of ninety (90) days of the filing of the judg-
ment with the clerk of the court, to vacate or modify such judgment or order: (4)
For misrepresentation or fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic) by an adverse party.
242. 361 Ark. 244,206 S.W.3d 229 (2005).






249. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, *5.
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c. Act 1736 of 2001
The majority began its analysis of Act 1736 by illustrating how it had
addressed the prior version of Arkansas Code section 9-10-115 in Wil-
liams.25 In Williams, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it previously
held in Littles v. Flemings251 that a father was entitled to relief from child
support after DNA testing proved he was not the child's biological father.25 2
The majority further quoted its language from Williams in order to make a
distinction between judicial findings of paternity and presumptions of pater-
nity in divorce decrees. 253 The court in Williams held that section 9-10-115
was part of the Paternity Code and was not intended to extend to divorce
decrees.2 4 Furthermore, in Williams, the court reasoned that, in the latter
situation, there was a marriage; therefore, a parent-child relationship had
already been established.255
The majority then acknowledged Act 1736 of 2001, which declares
when a paternity test can be administered and the effects thereof. 6 The
General Assembly passed the Act after the Arkansas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Williams.257 The majority recognized, but disagreed with, the appel-
lant's argument that Williams had been abrogated by Act 1736 of 2001.258
The appellant argued that Act 1736 allowed for any man to challenge the
paternity of a child, including those doing so in the context of a divorce pro-
250. Id.
251. 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998).
252. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *5. It is important to note that in Littles the putative
father had been adjudicated as the father in a previous paternity suit. Littles v. Flemings, 333
Ark. 476, 478, 970 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1998).
253. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *6.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Act 1736 amended ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 to include the following relevant
provisions:
(e)(1)(A) When any man has been adjudicated to be the father of a child or is
deemed to be the father of a child pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity
without the benefit of scientific testing for paternity and as a result was ordered
to pay child support, he shall be entitled to one (1) paternity test, pursuant to § 9-
10-108, at any time during the period of time that he is required to pay child sup-
port upon the filing of a motion challenging the adjudication or acknowledgment
of paternity in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(f)(1) If the test administered under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section excludes
the adjudicated father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowl-
edgment of paternity as the biological father of the child and the court so finds,
the court shall set aside the previous finding or establishment of paternity and re-
lieve him of any future obligations of support as of the date of the finding.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(e)(1)(A), (f)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (emphasis added).
257. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *6.
258. Id.
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ceeding and allowed him to have his support obligations terminated if scien-
tific testing excluded him as the biological father. 59
The majority addressed the basic rules of statutory construction and
pointed out that effect must be given to the intent of the General Assem-
bly.26° After a review of the language of Act 1736 of 2001, the majority
noted that it was not persuaded that the General Assembly intended to over-
rule Williams.2 ' The court reasoned that even though the statute was
amended, it was part of the Paternity Code, and despite the distinction made
by the Williams court regarding the difference between "adjudicated father"
under the paternity code and "adjudicated father" under divorce decrees, the
legislature did not enact legislation outside of the Paternity Code.262 The
majority further pointed out that "the legislature is presumed to know the
decisions of the supreme court, and it will not be presumed in construing a
statute that the legislature intended to require the court to pass again upon a
subject where its intent is not expressed in unmistakable language. ' 263 The
majority concluded that Act 1736 of 2001 did not abrogate Williams, and
subsequent amendments to Arkansas Code section 9-10-115 did not apply to
a paternity determination arising as a matter of presumption under a divorce
decree.2"
2. Justice Brown 's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brown, in his dissent, criticized the majority's reading of Ar-
kansas Code section 9-10-115, as amended in 2001, and argued that the sec-
tion should apply to any man adjudicated to be the father of a minor child.265
Justice Brown cited McCormac v. McCormac266 to show that the Arkansas
Supreme Court had previously held that a divorce decree qualifies as an
adjudication of paternity.267 Justice Brown also argued that the General As-
sembly's insertion of the words "any man" into the statute was unambiguous
and clearly an attempt to extend the Paternity Code's applicability to divorce
decrees.268 Justice Brown added that the distinction made by the majority
"flies in the face of the clear and exact language of Act 173 6.
' 269
259. Id. at *5.
260. Id. at *6.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *7.
263. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *7.
264. Id.
265. Id. at *7 (Brown, J., dissenting).
266. 304 Ark. 89, 799 S.W.2d 806 (1990).





Justice Brown further noted that because Act 1736 extended the time
frame for challenging a paternity adjudication to anytime during which the
father is required to pay child support, the appellant fell under the statute
because he was still required to pay child support at the time he challenged
his paternity. 20 For the above stated reasons, Justice Brown concluded that
the language in Act 1736 was intended to encompass divorce decrees and
stated that both the circuit court and majority erred in dismissing the appel-
lant's challenge to the child support obligation.27'
IV. ANALYSIS
The following section discusses the majority's emphasis in Martin v.
Pierce on the established parent-child relationship in making its decision not
to allow paternity disestablishment or child support termination. Based on
the particular facts of this case, public policy dictated strict adherence to res
judicata in favor of the best interest of the child. Martin leaves unanswered,
however, the question of how Arkansas would resolve the issue of paternity
disestablishment when public policy does not dictate such a rigid application
of res judicata. To resolve the conflicting interests that evolve from this is-
sue, this note proposes mandatory paternity testing at the child's birth.
"The most important legal determination affecting children is the legal
definition of parenthood and the lines of responsibility that connect parents
and children." '272 In Martin, the Arkansas Supreme Court valued an estab-
lished parent-child relationship as something more than shared DNA and
concluded that a continued relationship was in the child's best interest.273 A
man who functioned as a child's father for a number of years is every bit as
much a parent as a man who is biologically related to a child.
When balancing the best interests of fathers and children, the Arkansas
Supreme Court was correct to strike the balance in favor of the best interest
of the children. Any other decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court would
have rendered a sixteen-year-old child illegitimate and without support from
the only father C.M. had ever known. This was not a situation in which
another man was asserting paternity of the child, but one which would have
left C.M. with no father at all.
The majority in Martin relied heavily on the public policy concerns
discussed by the Vermont Supreme Court in Godin v. Godin.274 Godin is
similar to Martin in that both fathers sought to render a child illegitimate
270. Id.
271. Id.at*9.
272. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1014 (2003).
273. Martin, 2007 WL 1447911, at *3-6.
274. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998). See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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after several years of a parent-child relationship. Both children faced the
possibility of being abandoned by the only fathers they had ever known. The
majority's reliance on Godin was well placed, and Arkansas should continue
to follow this line of reasoning in situations in which a child is facing bas-
tardization after several years of an established parent-child relationship.
Although the father obviously suffers by either being forced to contin-
ue paying child support or providing for the child's needs, the child is the
true victim in this situation. This does not mean that a presumed father's
interest in "ascertaining the genetic 'truth' of a child's origins" '275 is irrele-
vant, but, instead, that it is outweighed by the best interest of the child.
A. Psychological Importance of Fathers
It is often asserted that children do best when raised in a two-parent
household.27 6 Unfortunately, it is impossible for all children to be raised by
both parents in a marital union. Thus, the law must articulate ways to protect
children who are the product of a divorce and who might find themselves
without a father present in their lives.
Psychological studies show the negative effects on children when a
parent disappears from their life.277 These studies show that a child who
feels abandoned by his or her father "may exhibit confusion, depression, an
inability to get along with others, withdrawal, difficulty in school, and even-
tual sexual problems." '278 Thus, a child needs to have an established relation-
ship with both parents who share the responsibility and concern for the
child's well-being. 27 9 Even when the father's presence is scarce, the child
still needs and uses his or her father.2 80
The withdrawal of a father from a child's life can have devastating ef-
fects, and the Arkansas Supreme Court was correct to avert those effects.
The law must do what is best for the child, despite any inconvenience forced
upon the presumed father. An established parent-child relationship should
not be destroyed because they do not share the same DNA; "[p]arenting,
275. Godin, 725 A.2d at 910.
276. Sheila F. G. Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18 FAM. L.Q. 225,
230 (1984).
277. Frank J. Dyer, Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment Theory: The
Case of Kaylee, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 5, 6-8 (2004).
278. Schwartz, supra note 276, at 230.
279. Id. at 232.
280. Id. "Even in these proof relationships the father's presence kept the child from wor-
rying about abandonment and total rejection and the nagging self-doubts which followed. The
father also provided a presence, however limited, which diminished the child's sense of vul-
nerability and aloneness, and total dependency on one parent." Id. at 232-33.
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once undertaken, is or should be a lifetime responsibility." '' When a parent-
child relationship has been established, as in Martin, "genes should not de-
fine fatherhood," ' and the law should not penalize children for the actions
of their mothers.283 The majority in Martin, therefore, was correct to protect
the stability of the family unit by requiring Martin to continue his relation-
ship with the child.
B. Weaknesses of a Strict Application of Res Judicata in All Paternity
Determinations
The court draws a distinction between an acknowledgment of paternity
under the Paternity Code and an acknowledgment of paternity in a divorce
decree.284 The majority rests this distinction on the fact that, in the latter
situation, "children have known the husbands as their fathers. 2 85 A parental
relationship, therefore, has been established and the stability of the family
unit is at issue.286 The court emphasizes that "this distinction lies at the heart
of the disparate treatment accorded scientific testing after a finding of pater-
nity under the Paternity Code and scientific testing which occurs after a di-
vorce decree under our caselaw.
' 287
Based on the circumstances in Martin, the court rested its decision
solely on the grounds of public policy. But what happens when the circums-
tances do not dictate such a strict application of res judicata to paternity de-
terminations? Consider the following situation.
281. Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 323, 324 (2004).
282. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Father-
hood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 134 (2003).
283. Rather than focusing on the injustice forced upon them, adjudicated fathers should
instead focus on the lifelong relationships they could have with these children. Unfortunately
this does not seem to be the trend. For example, after biological tests showed no DNA match
between a father and his six-year-old twins the father commented, "[t]he anger grows and
grows, and it just keeps chipping away at your love for those children." Julie Rawe, Duped
Dads Fight Back, TIME, Jan. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580398-1,00.html. Or consider a man
who has centered his life around battling paternity fraud rather than focusing on his relation-
ship with his fourteen-year-old daughter. Patrick McCarthy was unsuccessful in terminating
his legal obligations to his fourteen-year-old daughter after learning that he was not the bio-
logical father. As a result, McCarthy formed an organization "that recently paid $50,000 for
nine billboards along highways that show a pregnant woman and reads 'Is It Yours? If Not,
You Still Have to Pay!"' Jacobs, supra note 31, at 195.
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What if a child is born during the marriage and the parents divorce two
months later? The divorce decree states that a child was born of the mar-
riage, and the court awards custody, orders child support, and sets visitation.
Suppose that three months after the decree is entered, the presumed father
learns that he is not the child's biological father. In addition, the child's bio-
logical father, who is more financially stable than the putative father, is
identified and willing to raise the child. If the putative father requests a
DNA test and asks that all child support obligations be terminated, would
the Arkansas Supreme Court come to the same conclusion as it did in Mar-
tin? Would Arkansas courts still require the putative father to continue to
pay child support for a nonbiological child, even though public policy no
longer dictates such a result? Based on the court's decision in Martin and
subsequent Arkansas decisions, the answer appears to be "yes."
The public policy concerns, however, no longer dictate such a strong
adherence to res judicata in the preceding hypothetical. In contrast to Mar-
tin, no parent-child relationship has yet been established, and there is no risk
of the child being rendered illegitimate. In the previous hypothetical, the
child even has the possibility of being supported by someone who is more
financially stable than the putative father. Forcing the nonbiological father
to continue paying child support for a child with whom he has no parental
relationship is unfair when the concerns for the best interest of the child are
no longer present.
So where should the courts draw the line? When has a parent-child re-
lationship been established? At what age will the courts consider it to be in
the best interest of the child for a nonbiological father to continue to pay
child support? Martin v. Pierce leaves these questions unanswered. In Mar-
tin, public policy outweighed any inconvenience forced upon the father by
having to continue to pay child support for a child that was not his, but, as
illustrated in the previous hypothetical, that will not always be the case.
C. Mandatory Paternity Testing as a Solution
As a solution to this problem, the law should require mandatory pater-
nity determination at birth.288 Biological testing should be made a routine
part of the birth process, and then doubts regarding biological certainty
would be resolved at the beginning of the parent-child relationship rather
than later.289
288. "Fathers are more likely to remain committed to their children if they are either
certain of paternity, or they have, with or without the formality of adoption, knowingly ac-
cepted responsibility for someone else's child." Cahn & Carbone, supra note 272, at 1067.
289. Id. at 1067.
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Men, however, should be allowed to waive testing. But if a man waives
DNA testing at the time of the child's birth, he will do so with the know-
ledge that he will be estopped from subsequent challenges to paternity.290 In
order to receive recognition as the father, however, the husband "should be
required to acknowledge the possibility that he is not a biological parent,
and that he is nonetheless assuming the full responsibilities and obligations
of parenthood., 29' Later, therefore, a man cannot disclaim responsibility for
a child for whom he has functioned as a father.292
This solution promotes stability for the child and "impose[s] legal obli-
gations on those who self-identify through voluntary acknowledgments or
paternity testing at the time of a child's birth. 2 93 Similarly, this proposal
will deter fraud and eliminate the possibility that a man will have to unwil-
lingly continue to pay child support for a child that is not biologically his.
Courts will continue to face similar conflicts in the future as more paternity
disputes arise, and mandatory paternity testing at birth will eliminate these
conflicts by effectively taking into account the perspective of both the father
and the child.
Katie S. Allen*
290. Id. at 1068.
291. Id. "Present law draws a clear distinction between married men, who are presumed
on the basis of marriage to be fathers, and unmarried men, who must hold out a child as their
own. The distinctions between married and unmarried men should largely be eliminated, and
both should be subject" to this set of rules. Id. at 1067.
292. Similarly, a mother should be required to join in the acknowledgement of paternity
so that she cannot contest paternity in the event she realizes that someone else fathered the
child. Both parties, therefore, "signing such a declaration without paternity testing would then
be estopped from later challenging the parental status established through the declaration." Id.
at 1068.
293. Id. at 1069. This proposal is controversial, in part, because mandatory paternity
testing at birth may break up a number of marriages. The court's focus, however, should be
on the child's need for secure parental relationships.
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